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The court reasoned that this disbarment was not unconstitutional asamounting
to removal in a manner not prescribed by the constitution, since the court was
not removing the commonwealth's attorney from his office, but was only taking
away his right to practice law.19 This position seems well justified in view of the
necessity that a court exert discipline upon its attorneys, whose unprofessional
acts may discredit it.
This decision may be a significant precedent for influence by federal courts
over the conduct of state officers. Prosecuting attorneys in fear of federal disenrollment and possible subsequent state disbarment may feel compelled to perform their duties in a manner satisfactory to the federal courts of their district.
The federal court may therefore effectively prescribe standards for state's attorneys in the conduct of their offices, even though that conduct may relate solely
to the state. Moreover, if the federal courts have this power over prosecuting
attorneys, it would seem that they have it as well over other government officials, state or federal, whose duties require them to be attorneys.2 0 Safeguards
against abuse of this power exist in the requirements of elementary due process,
notice, and hearing laid down in Ex parte Wall.= But, however the federal
courts choose to use this power, it is clear that they have a potent weapon at
their disposal. The mere threat of disenrollment may at times be enough to
compel an otherwise remiss or dishonest official to perform the duties of his
office in accordance with the law.

VALIDATION OF MAIL-ORDER DIVORCE
THROUGH CHANGE OF DOMICILE
The plaintiff and her first husband were married in New York in 1929, and
were domiciled there until their separation. In 1934, a Mexican decree of
divorce was issued to the plaintiff, although neither the plaintiff nor her first
husband ever went to Mexico for the purpose of the divorce action. In 1935, the
plaintiff celebrated a ceremony of marriage with her alleged second husband,
with whom plaintiff resided in New Jersey until his death in r944. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff applied for widow's insurance benefits under the Social
X"Courts of other states have similarly held. State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, 6i S.E. 355
(xgo8); In re Voss, ir N.D. 540, 90 N.W. z5 (29o2); In re Simpson, 9 N.D. 379, 83 N.W. 54I
(igoo); In re Jones, 70 Vt. 7, 39 At. 1087 (1897). Later, in Commonwealth v. Howard, 297
Ky. 488, i8o S.W. 2d 415 (1944), the Kentucky Court of Appeal refused to remove a commonwealth's attorney in statutory proceedings similar to quo warranto on the ground that a
commonwealth's attorney is a constitutional officer removable only by impeachment.
2*This would not be true in some jurisdictions with respect to the disbarment of judges
where disbarment means loss of office. In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102, 84 N.Y. Supp. 1025
(I903); In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927).
21 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
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Security Act., The Social Security Board found that the plaintiff was not a
widow of the alleged second husband within the meaning of the Social Security
Act on the grounds that the Mexican decree had not dissolved her first marriage
and that her first husband was still alive. The plaintiff thereafter instituted this
action in a federal district court of New Jersey. Thp court, as directed by the
Social Security Act,2 applied the law of the domicile of the second husband, i.e.
New Jersey, in determining the status of the plaintiff and held that it was without jurisdiction to challenge the validity of the divorce decree of x934 in the
absence of residence by one or both of the parties in New Jersey at the time of
the alleged divorce. Consequently, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to the
social security benefits sought. Sherman v. Federal Security Agency, Social
Security Board.3
The uncertainty as to the recognition that will be given a divorce decree
granted in a jurisdiction other than that of the forum in which the decree is
challenged has long created pitfalls for spouses who consider themselves divorced. Since the famous Williams cases, 4 recognition in jurisdictions within the
United States is no longer questionable if the divorce was granted by a state in
which at least one of the spouses was undoubtedly domiciled. In other cases, the
effectiveness of an out-of-state divorce is still beset with problems. In the Williams cases, the state of the alleged domicile had to rule with respect to the
validity of a divorce granted by a foreign state. In the instant case, however, the
forum had to rule with respect to the validity of a divorce granted by a foreign
country, while the parties were unquestionably domiciled in a foreign sisterstate. Despite the limited number of occasions upon which such a problem has
arisen, several varying solutions are already present in American decisions. A
review of these decisions confirms the existence of uncertainties that may arise
to plague spouses who suppose themselves divorced.
The federal district court arrived at its decision that it was "without jurisdiction to nullify" the Mexican decree on the basis of New Jersey precedents, by
which it was bound under the Social Security Act. These precedents enunciate
the policy of the New Jersey courts of refusing to hear either directs or collateral6 attacks upon divorces granted by one foreign state to domiciliaries of
another foreign state. Similarly, the courts of the District of Columbia decline
' Social Security Act § 202(e)(i), 53 Stat.

U.S.C.A. § 402(e)(I) (1943).
U.S.C.A. § 409(m) (1943).

1361 (I939), 42

2 Social Security Act § 209(m), 57 Stat. 47 (1943),

42

I70 F. Supp. 758 (N.J., x947).
4 Williams
226 (1945).

v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.

287 (1942);

Williams v. North Carolina,

325 U.S.

sFloyd v. Floyd, 95 N.J. Eq. 661, 124 Atl. 525 (1924); Greensaft v. Greensaft, 12o N.J. Eq.
(x936).
N.J. Misc. 526 (1924). But see Robins v. Robins, 1o3 N.J. Eq. 26, 142 AtI.
i68 (1928).
2o8, 184 Atl. 529
6
In re West, 2
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to entertain attacks upon divorce decrees granted spouses who, at the time the
decree was issued, had no close tie with the District7
What may be called the New Jersey doctrine of disinterest appears to represent only a minority view. Most courts faced with the problem of the instant
cast have at least accepted jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the challenged divorce. However, the courts accepting such jurisdiction do not agree as
to the law that should be applied in determining the validity of the divorce.
Some courts have treated the challenged divorce decree as if it had been
granted to spouses domiciled in the forum state at the time the decree was
rendered.' According to this view, only the law of the forum is examined to
determine the extent to which the decree should be honored. Had the federal
district court adopted this approach in the instant case, it would have applied
New Jersey domestic law to determine the validity of the 1934 Mexican mailorder divorce and would have found such divorce to be invalid.9
Other courts, notably those of New York, have made use of a technique which
is sometimes, although improperly, called the "renvoi" doctrine, ° in which the
validity of the divorce is tested under the law of the domicile of the spouses as of
the time of the decree.- Had the federal district court, in the case at hand, followed this approach, it would have had to ascertain the recognition given by
7 Curley

v. Curley,

12o

F. 2d 731 (App. D.C., 1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 614 (1941). The

courts of the District of Columbia will sometimes entertain such attacks when the parties are
found to have some connection with the District which falls short of domicile: "These parties
are in every real sense, members of tle District community; even though during a part of their
married life they occupied one of its Maryland bedrooms." White v. White, 1so F. 2d i57, x58
(App. D.C., 1945); cf. Melvin v. Melvin, 129 F. 2d 39 (App. D.C., 1942).
8Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. 186 (C.C.A. 5th, 1915), cert. den. 239 U.S. 643 (i915); Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. 2d 8o6 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936); Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 835, i1o So.
539 (1926), approved in Passailaigue v. Herron, 38 F. 2d 775 (C.C.A. 5th, 193o); In re James's
Estate, 99 Cal. 374, 33 Pac. 1122 (1893); Broder v. Broder, 122 Cal. App. 296, 2o P. 2d 182
(1932); Commonwealth v. Yarnell, 313 Pa. 244, 169 At]. 370 (1933). This is the view followed

by the courts of the District of Columbia when they choose to entertain attacks upon foreign
divorces granted to non-domiciliaries of the District. White v. White, iSo F. 2d 157 (App.
D.C., 1945).
9In Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. i86 (C.C.A. 5th, 1915), cert. den. 239 U.S. 643 (1915), a
husband and wife were domiciled in California. The husband deserted his wife and left for
Texas, stopping off in Missouri long enough to obtain a divorce. The husband remarried in
Texas, where he resided until his death. In a contest between the wives for shares in the husband's estate, the court held the Missouri divorce invalid in Texas, without making a single
reference to California law.
lo Ball v. Cross, 231 N.Y. 329, 132 N.E. io6 (1921); Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240, 149 N.E.
844 (1925); Ir re Caltabellotta's Will, 183 App. Div. 750, 171 N.Y. Supp. 82 (i918); In re
Baker's Estate, 112 N.Y. Misc. 295, 183 N.Y. Supp. 139 (1920); Powell v. Powell, 211 App.
Div. 750, 2o8 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1925); Smith v. Smith, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (945); Lariviere v.
Lariviere,

102

Vt. 278, 147 Atl. 700

(1929);

People v. Shaw, 259 11. 544,102 N.E. io3I (1937).

- "The forum recognizes as a part of its conflict of laws the proposition that when another
court has granted a decree of divorce, whether or not it had jurisdiction is to be determined
according to the law of the domicile of the parties at the time of the decree. For want of a
better name, this rule is spoken of as the renvoi." Renvoi in Divorce Jurisdiction, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 64o, 641 (1926). But see Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws 621 (i947).
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New York courts to a Mexican mall-order divorce granted to New York domiciliaries,"2 with the result that the divorce would also have been found invalid.3
In defense of its position, the New Jersey courts have maintained that "to
entertain a suit of [this] character .... would have a pernicious tendency to
convert this state into a Mecca for disgruntled divorcees" who seek to have
unsatisfactory divorces set aside.4 The stand taken by the New Jersey courts,
to counteract this "pernicious tendency" would seem, however, to have the
unwholesome consequence of making New Jersey a haven for fickle spouses
with divorces which would be of dubious value elsewhere in the United States.
In the instant case, for example, the New Jersey Court, by denying to itself the
authority to challenge the foreign decree, in effect approved a Mexican mailorder divorce. The New Jersey position, insofar as it leads to the recognition of
Mexican mail-order divorces granted to non-domiciliaries of New Jersey, may
also be criticized as discriminating against New Jersey domiciliaries, for both
New Jersey statute's and case-law"6 declare that mail-order divorces obtained by
New Jersey domiciliaries will be given no recognition in New Jersey courts.
The instant case presents an anomalous spectacle in that the plaintiff won
recognition of a highly questionable divorce simply by moving from one state
with notably strict marital laws into another state with equally strict marital
laws. The plaintiff's victory, dependent upon the happy accident of a fortunate
change of domicile, indicates that an element of fortuitousness remains in a
field of law in which "intensely practical considerations"7 demand maximum
certainty.
The extremes to which New Jersey would extend its doctrine of disinterest
remain a matter for speculation. The consequence of this case is to give recognition to a divorce granted by a court which had never seen nor heard the parties
involved. Logically, it would seem that recognition will have to be given by New
Jersey courts, should the occasion ever arise, to a rabbinical divorce'8 granted to
domiciliaries of some American state other than New Jersey, or even to a mere
- In the leading case of Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240, 149 N.E. 844 ('925), a husband and
wife were domiciled in Ontario. The husband deserted the wife, obtained a Pennsylvania
divorce, and became a resident of New York. The wife subsequently brought suit in New York
for divorce and support. The New York court refused to recognize the Pennsylvania divorce
on the grounds that it was invalid in Ontario, and held that the wife could maintain the action.
'3 New York does not recognize Mexican mail-order divorces granted to NewYork domiciliaries. Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E. 2d 423 (1943); Lent v. Lent, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 569
(i944); Wynn v. Wynn, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 259 (1946).
'4 Floyd v. Floyd, 95 N.J. Eq. 661, 665, 124 Atl. 525, 527 (1924).
sN.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), tit. 2, c. 50, § 35.
Z6Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N.J. Eq. 261, 1io Atl. r9 (1920); Sechler v. Sechler,
94 N.J. Eq. 47, 1i8 Atl. 629 (1922); Reik v. Reik, 1o9 N.J. Eq. 615, 158 AUt. Sig (1932).
'7 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301 (1942).
28See Chertok v. Chertok, 208 App. Div. 16l, 2o3 N.Y. Supp. 163 (1924); cf. N.Y. Penal
Law (McKinney, 1944), c. 39, § i451.
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agreement of divorce 9 executed by spouses domiciled in some other jurisdiction.
Thus in this group of cases, New Jersey would seem to sanction what, in the
words of Mr. Justice Jackson, is the settling of family relationships "by a procedure that we would not recognize if the suit were one to collect a grocery bill." 0
Both the New Jersey approach and the approach of those courts which view a
foreign divorce granted to non-domiciliaries of the forum state in the same light
as a foreign divorce granted to a domiciliary of the forum state, ignore the principle that the effect of a transaction affecting marital status of spouses is to be
determined under the personal law of the spouses at the time the transaction
took place.21 In Anglo-American jurisdictions the personal law of an individual
is the law of his domicile. =
The doctrine applied by the New Jersey courts with respect to divorce overlooks the basic distinction between the principal issue of the case and questions
which are to be decided incidentally to that issue. Lack of jurisdiction can exist
only with respect to a case as such; but once a court has decided that it will try
a case, it cannot decline jurisdiction to pass on a question which must necessarily be decided in order to resolve the main issue. In the instant litigation between the plaintiff and the Federal Security Agency, the court had to decide
whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to social security benefits. The court
unquestionably had jurisdiction to entertain this suit. In the course of the
litigation it had to pass upon the question of whether or not the plaintiff was
the widow of the person insured, and in the course of this problem, it became
relevant to determine whether or not the plaintiff's divorce from her former
husband was valid. The decision of this question could not be avoided as the
court had accepted jurisdiction of the case. In maintaining that it had no jurisdiction to decide that question, the court actually decided it in favor of the
plaintiff. This result may appear to be justified by the equities of the case, but it
cannot be justified by an alleged failure to take jurisdiction.
If applied consistently, this doctrine of the New Jersey courts would result in
strange decisions in cases other than those concerned with divorce. If, for instance, in a separate maintenance- suit between residents of New Jersey the
validity of the alleged marriage were put in issue, the court could never decide
this question; for at the time of their marriage, the parties had not yet been
domiciled in New Jersey, and the court in declining to pass on the question
would necessarily have to accept without inquiry the plaintiff wife's contention
that the marriage is valid. Should the validity of such a marriage between nonresidents of New Jersey be placed in issue in a litigation regarding the distribution of the New Jersey assets of a decedent, the outcome would depend
solely upon the fortuitous circumstance of whether the plaintiff alleged the

19
See La Framboise v. Day, 136 Minn. 239, 16i N.W. 529 (I9M7).
2o Williams v.

North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 (1942).
Beale, Conflict of Laws § io.4 (1935); Niboyet v. Niboyet, 3 P.D. 52 (1878).
- For a list of the nations which apply domiciliary law to problems of personal status, see
Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study ixo-ii (1945).
'r
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validity or the invalidity of the marriage. Similarly, if a New Jersey court had
to pass on the question as to where a change of title to a chattel occurred while
the chattel was not in New Jersey, it would have to declare itself incapable of
passing upon the question even if that question were presented in a litigation
between two New Jersey parties. Such results would be ludicrous and would, of
course, not be accepted by a New Jersey court. However, on principle, the
problems are not different from that of the instant case.

APPRAISAL RIGHT OF PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS
IN MERGER WITH PAPER SUBSIDIARY
In March 1941, certain preferred shareholders of a Delaware corporation
brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin the merger of the corporation
with a paper subsidiary which had been set up as part of a plan to eliminate
cumulative preferred arrearages.' The proposed merger plan, according to the
preferred shareholders, was grossly unfair because it gave benefits to the common stock which, they asserted, had no equity in the corporation. The court
found that the common had an equity in the corporation and denied the injunction.2 After the merger was completed other dissenting preferred shareholders
exercised their statutory appraisal right and demanded cash payment for their
shares. The appraisers fixed a value of $9o per preferred share which was far
below the figure of $r97.5o necessary to cover par plus arrearages, and the corporation thereupon filed a petition in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel
the dissenters to deliver their stock certificates on payment of the appraisal
figure. The dissenters cross-petitioned to have the $9o appraisal valuation set
aside on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the findings of the court
in the injunction suit, and they asked that a new appraisal be made. The Delaware court held that no significant inconsistency existed, and ordered the dissenters to deliver their stock certificates at the value set by the appraisers.
Root v. York Corp.3
In 1936 the Delaware court had taken the position that preferred dividend
arrearages were "vested rights" in the nature of a debt, and that they could not
be scaled down by charter amendments.4 The same court in i94o, however,
decided that such arrearages could be scaled down in mergers, even where the
merger was between a corporation and a dummy subsidiary.s In denying that
I Under the merger plan the preferred shareholders, who held 25 per cent of the voting control, were offered 83.2 per cent of a new single issue of common stock, while the common shareholders, previously in the majority, were to take 16.8 per cent of the new issue.
'Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 45 F. Supp. 436 (Del., x942), aff'd '36 F. 2d
944 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1943), noted in 43 Col. L. Rev. 23o (1943).
3o
A. 2d 52 (Del. Ch., 1946).
4Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 19o At. II$(1936).
sFederal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 3i8, ii A. 2d 331, (1940).

